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TORT Lazer:
LAWTort Law
Honorable Leon D. Lazer
Hon. Leon D. Lazer:
I am going to discuss three cases this afternoon, Metro North,'
Saratoga' and Suitum Let us turn to the first of these cases and
see how the United States Supreme Court deals with the question
of emotional or mental distress in a tort case. The state courts
have dealt with this issue for many decades, and while the debate
still continues, it has largely been resolved in most places.
Metro North Conunuter Railroad v. Buckley4 involved the
Federal Employers Liability Act,5 commonly known as FELA.
FELA permits a railroad worker to recover for injury "resulting"
from the "employer's" negligence. 6 Over the years the statute
has been very liberally interpreted. 7 Some people think it
amounts to a worker's compensation statute; others have
indicated it is similar to insurance. 8 While the courts take a
liberal approach towards FELA, 9 it is still necessary to establish
negligence causation.
In Metro North, the plaintiff-employee Buckley, was a
pipefitter,10 who was exposed to asbestos for an hour a day over a

period of three years." At the end of the day he often found
himself covered with insulation dust containing asbestos.' 2 He
Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 117 S. Ct. 2113 (1997).
Fishing Co. v. Martinac & Co., 117 S. Ct. 1783 (1997).
3 Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'1 Planning Agency, 117 S. Ct. 1659 (1997).
4 Metro-North, 117 S. Ct. at 2115.
5 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1997).
6 Metro-North, 117 S. Ct. at 2114 (quoting Consolidated Rail Corp. v.
Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532 (1996)).
7Id. at 2117.
s Id. at 2116 (stating that the Act does not make the railroad an "insurer" for
all employees injuries).
2 Saratoga

9

Id. at 2117.

'0 Id. at 2116.
" Id. (stating that for 3 years 1985 - 1988 Buckley's job exposed him to
asbestos for about one hour per working day).
12 Id.
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was, in the terminology of the case, a "snowman." He attended14
asbestos-awareness class, 3 and feared he would develop cancer.
An expert testified that Buckley had a one in five chance of dying
from cancer. 15 Up to the time of trial, periodical medical6 checkups revealed no cancer, nor any asbestos-related disease.'
He brought an action under FELA to recover for his emotional
distress (fear of the disease),' 7 a concept well-known in the New
York State courts.' 8 He also sought the cost of future medical
check-ups,' 9 which, in the opinion, was referred to as medical
monitoring. If asbestos or some other asbestos-related disease
surfaced, he would want to catch it early. The railroad's position
was that FELA does not permit any recovery for emotional
distress without accompanying physical impact.20
The physical impact rule goes way back in New Yorki 2' and
other states' common law. 2 The rule is predicated on the
contention that anyone can feign emotional distress and one way
to assure, or at least have some evidence that emotional distress is
legitimate, is if it accompanies some physical impact.' If there is
a physical injury followed by emotional distress, there never has
been, in our modem era, any reluctance to compensate for
emotional distress following an accident.

13Id.
14 Id.

1"Id. (stating that two of Buckley's expert witnesses testified that, even after
taking into account Buckley's now discarded 15 year one pack per day
smoking habit, the exposure created an added risk of death due to cancer or
other asbestos related diseases of anywhere from one percent to five percent

(in view of one of plaintiff's expert or one percent to three percent in view of
the other)).
16 Id.
17 Id.

" Id. See Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532 (1994).
19 Id.
20 Id.

at 2117.
(citing Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 79 F.3d 1337,
1344 (2d Cir. 1996), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 379 (1997)).
Id.
2! Id.

23 Id.
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The problem arises when the emotional distress does not follow
or result from that particular kind of injury. The state courts
have struggled with this issue. 24 Some still require physical
impact, some require some physical result from the emotional
distress.' The jurisdictions are split on this issue.2
In this case, the district court dismissed the casep on the

contention that there could not be a recovery for emotional
distress without impact - fear of future disease was not enough.'
The Second Circuit reversed, 29 holding that Buckley's contact
with the dust was a physical impact. 30 The court stated that the
case could go to the jury and Buckley could recover for both
3
emotional distress and future medical monitoring costs. '
The case then went to the Supreme Court. 2 In an opinion
written by Justice Breyer, the Court relied on common law

principles? 3 Theoretically at least, with some exception, there is
no federal common law dealing with a tort case like this. The

Id. at 2117 (stating that "common-law principles where not rejected in the
text are entitled to great weight in interpreting the Act, and that those
principles play a significant role in determining whether, or when, an
employee can recover damages for negligent infliction of emotional
distress.").
I' Id. (referring to an exposure that poses some future risk of disease and
which contact causes emotional distress only because the worker learns that he
may become ill after a substantial period of time).
26 Id. at 2118 (stating that "the common-law precedent does not favor the
plaintiff. Common-law courts do permit a plaintiff who suffers from a disease
to recover for emotional distress, and some courts permit a plaintiff who
exhibits a physical symptom of exposure to recover.").
27Id. at 2116.
24

2S

Id.

9id.
I Id. (stating that Buckley's evidence showed that his contact with the
insulation dust containing asbestos was "massive, lengthy and tangible.").
31Id.
32 Id.

(stating that certiorari was granted to "review the Second Circuit's
holdings in light of Gottshall.").
3"Id. at 2115.
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Court needed to resort to the judicial systems that had, over time,
developed a jurisprudence in this area.34
Justice Breyer, in his opinion, referred to the concerns I
mentioned - the validity of emotional distress claims in general
and how the state courts have resolved these issues.35 He referred

to negligent infliction of emotional distress, the zone of danger
cases. 36 For those of you who are not familiar with these cases,
they involve claims of people who are close relatives of persons
injured in an accident, where the plaintiff, although not injured,
was in the zone of danger, close to where the occurrence took
place.37

This is the New York rule. 3'

The rule is very restrictive

because, unless you are part of a nuclear family and in the same
car, 39 or very close to the place where the injury occurred to the
plaintiff,' you cannot recover for negligent infliction of
emotional distress." This is something that students learn in law
school -- it is basic New York law.
Justice Breyer referred to this rule indicating that it is very
restrictive and there is concern relative to the legitimacy of the

' Id. at 2117. See also Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532
(1994). The Court in Gottshall stated that a "Court's duty.., in interpreting
FELA ... is to develop a federal common law of negligence." Id. at 558
(citing Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 568-70
(1987)).
35
Metro-North, 117 S. Ct. at 2116-17.
36 d. at 2117 (quoting Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968)).
37 id.

38 Id. at 2117 (stating that the Second Circuit interpreted "physical impact"
as including a simple physical contact with a substance that might cause a
disease at a future time, so long as the contact was a kind that would "cause
fear in a reasonable person.").
3 Id. (referring to Keck v. Jackson, 593 P.2d 668 (Ariz. 1979) (en banc).
Plaintiff brought an action against a motorist to recover for intentional
infliction if emotional distress which he suffered when he witnessed an
automobile collision in which his mother died. Id. at 668.
40 Id. (referring to Kimberley v. Howland, 55 S.E.778 (1906) (noting that
plaintiff suffered emotional distress from witnessing a rock which came from a
nearby blasting that crashed through his home).
41Metro North, 117 S. Ct. at 2117..
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instant type of claim.4 2 He explained that there is good reason for

the concern and then gave some frightening figures.43 I do not
want to frighten you this Friday afternoon, but he says that some
eleven to twenty-one million people have been exposed to
asbestos in the work place, 44 three-million have been exposed to
Benzene, 45 forty-three percent of United States children live in a
home with a smoker, 46 and two-hundred thousand people will be
dead of cancer caused by asbestos contact by the year two
thousand. 47 Then he gives us the killer here, which I hesitate to
tell you about. Half of all men in the United States will die of
cancer, 4" and one-third of all women.49
Justice Breyer then discussed the Gottshall case,50 which the
Court decided a couple of years earlier. Justice Breyer explained
that the term "physical impact" does not include simple contact
with a substance that might cause injury a substantial time later.51
He noted that physical impact does not encompass every form of
physical contact.52
In particular, it does not include a contact that amounts to no
more than an exposure,53 such as the one before us, to a
substance that poses some risk of future disease. Such contact
Id. at 2119 (stating special difficulties for judges and juries in separating
important claims from those that are invalid or "trivial.").
valid,
43
1d.
42

44Id.
45Id.
4Id.
47

Id.

48Id.

Id. (citing American Cancer Society, CancerFacts & Figures(1997)).
1 Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532 (1994). Plaintiff
brought this action against his employer for injury he sustained when he
observed his coworker suffer a heart attack. Id. at 536. In holding that
Gotshall had satisfied the necessary elements under FILA, it applied the "zone
of danger" test which limits recovery for emotional injury to those plaintiffs
who either sustain a physical impact as a result of the defendant's negligence
or are placed in immediate risk of physical impact by that negligence. Id. at
557.
S Metro North, 117 S. Ct. at 2116.
41

52

Id at 2118.
5 Id.
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causes emotional distress only because the worker learns that he
or she may become ill after a substantial period of time.5 4 Justice
Breyer declared, "If we are going to recognize as a physical
impact, simple contact with a substance, there is going to be a
great deal of difficulty in separating valid claims from trivial
claims. "5
Buckley could have transferred.56 He could have stopped
smoking.57

His

doctor never even

referred

him to

a

psychologist.5 8 Contact with carcinogens in our society is very
common. Justice Breyer referred to the "flood of cases" that
would overwhelm or certainly damage the system and diminish
the resources the system does have to deal with other cases. "
Therefore, this type of claim is not recognized, short of physical
impact and short of developing the disease itself.
The Court also rejected Buckley's claim of $950 a year, for
thirty-six years, for medical monitoring. o In dealing with
medical monitoring, Justice Breyer relied on some of the
rationale he used in rejecting the fear of future disease itself, that
is, how do you separate the trivial from the real.61 How could
you separate medical monitoring costs over a long period of time
from the regular check-up costs the plaintiff would have had what would be the effect on employers? 62 The claim as it was
presented, in a lump sum, was rejected. 63
Justice Ginsburg, in her dissenting opinion,' joined by Justice
Stevens, 6 pointed out that future medical monitoring costs are

54Id.
51 Id at
56 Id.

2119.

57 Id.
58

Id.

59 Id.
60

Id. at 2123.

61 Id.

62

Id. at 2122.
Id.
6 Id at 2124.
651 d. (Ginsburg, Stevens, M., concuring and dissenting in part).

63
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recognized in a number of states.0 The whole concept has been
gathering support. 67 She drew a very sympathetic picture of
Buckley himself and, in somewhat assertive terms, referred to
Justice Breyer's fear of the flood of litigation as overblown,S
referring to his entire opinion as enigmatic. 69 She explained there
may be some other way of handling these future costs - it
doesn't necessarily have to be a lump sum. 70 The Court should
not have been so quick to reject this idea. 7'
Perhaps future medical monitoring costs will become acceptable
in some different form, but as far as collecting these costs in
advance, the Court held it will not be presently allowed.7 FELA
cases are not that unusual.73
We will now discuss the Suitum74 case, a case that deals with the
question of land use and takings. The question of whether to go
into state or federal court in the regulatory land cases is an
interesting subject. There are many considerations involved.
Some years ago, I was representing a party who wanted to sue
the Town of Hempstead. It was necessary for me to bring the

IMd. at 2127 (Ginsburg, Stevens, JJ., concurring and dissenting in part).
Justice Ginsburg wrote:
Mhe Third Circuit, interpreting Pennsylvania law,
recognized a right to compensation for monitoring 'necessary
in order to diagnose properly the warning signs of the
disease.' Similarly, a number of Federal District Courts
interpreting state laws, and several state courts of first and
second instance, have sustained medical monitoring claims.
Id. (Ginsburg, Stevens, JJ., concurring and dissenting in part) (citations

omitted).
6

Id.

I Id. (stating that "the Court's anticipation of a "flood" of less important
cases" and "unlimited and unpredictable liability" is overblown.").
69 Id. (stating that "the Court's disposition of Buckley's constant and
established course.").
70
Id. at 2126.
71

Id.

72 dat 2129.

7 id.

' Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 117 S. Ct. 1659 (1997).
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lawsuit in Nassau County. 75 At that time, the supervisor of the

Town of Hempstead was also the county chairman of the
Republican Party. Because the Second Department was two
years behind, my client would have to wait a couple of years to
have the appeal heard had the case been dismissed. I would have
preferred to go into the federal court, but I was faced with
Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton
Bank.76 Williamson held that in order to bring a takings claim in
the federal court, the claim must be ripe.77
What does ripeness mean? It means that, as far as the state
remedies are concerned, you must have gone all the way. If
there are other things that could have been done under state law,

for example obtaining variances, they must have done them prior
to bringing the action in federal court. The state court would not
be bound by the federal ripeness rule and a land use action could
be brought in state court.

What happened in Suitum," is similar to what happened in the

pine barrens area of this county. In Suitum, a regional compact
between California and Nevada was approved by Congress."

The purpose of the compact was to try to prevent the Lake Tahoe
area from becoming overdeveloped - to prevent its beauty from
Thus, the Lake Tahoe
becoming irrevocably destroyed.8 0
Planning Agency was created with the power to restrict
11 This was necessary because one must sue the municipality in its own
county.
76 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
Petitioner, a successor in interest to developers,
brought this action against the Planning Commission alleging a taking. Id. at
175. The Supreme Court held that the Fifth Amendment requires just
compensation should be paid for a taking. Id. at 186. However, the Court
noted that the Fifth Amendment "does not require that just compensation be
paid in advance of, or contemporaneously with, the taking; all that is required
is that a 'reasonable, certain and adequate provision for obtaining
compensation' exist at the time of the taking." Id. at 194.
' Id. at 199 (holding that petitioner's jury verdict awarding damages for
temporary taking of property was premature because the developer's
application for the ordinance was not approved.)
7 Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 117 S. Ct. 1659 (1997).
79
Id. at 1662.
80 Id.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol14/iss2/12

8

Lazer: Tort Law

1998

TORT LAW

467

development of the area.81 Mrs. Suitum, who owned property in
the Lake Tahoe area, sought a building permit. 82 She was
rejected and told she was in a no-development area," just like
many pine barren property owners are told here.
The law under which the Lake Tahoe Agency operated84
provided that, if a property owner's land was put in a nodevelopment area, the property owner could receive TDRs

(transfer of development rights).8 For those of you who are not
familiar with land use, let me briefly explain what TDRs are.
If the government says you can not develop your own land, that
is confiscation.86 The government may decide, rather than agree
that they are confiscating your property, that they will give you
the right to sell, in essence, what they have taken away from you,
your development rights. You can not develop, but you have the
right to sell the rights to some other owner who has property it
can develop.
The other owner can now build a larger building or put more
houses or improvements on its land. The proceeds of such a sale
may save the government agency from a finding that its nodevelopment rule was confiscatoryY This device was developed

about twenty years ago. 88

Government agencies, such as

81 Id.
8Id.

8

Id.

at 1663.

8 Id. at 1662 (citing Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency Code of Ordinances
(TRPA Code) ch. 37).
1 Id. at 1663. An appraiser testified that if Suitum were to get a Residential
Allocation and sell it with a Development Right, together they would bring in
at least $30,000. Id. at 1664.
86 Id. at 1665. The Court explained that a regulation that "goes too far"
results in a Fifth Amendment taking. Id. The Fifth Amendment states that
private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
87 Id. at 1665. The Suitum Court quoted Williamson County v. Hamilton
Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 195 (1985) which stated that "if a State provides an
adequate procedure for seeking just compensation, the property owner cannot
claim a violation of the Just Compensation Clause until it has used the
procedure and been denied just compensation." Suitum, 117 S. Ct. at 1665.
1 See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
In Penn Central, New York City enacted a statute to preserve historic
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municipalities, decided that they could restrict development and at
the same time survive takings claims.89
Under the statute9 Mrs. Suitum had the right to the TDRs. 9"
There is no dispute in the case that she was entitled to them.92
However, she never applied for them -- never tried to sell them.'
When Suitum brought this action against the planning agency, its
defense was Williamson -- you have not exhausted your remedy,
or at least not gone as far you could go -- you did not even apply.
The Suitum case was dismissed.' 4 The dismissal was affirmed
in the Court of Appeals on the ground that there had been no final
decision that would allow the action to proceed in a Section 1983
case. 95 Until the planning agency took action on Suitum's
application for the TDRs, there could be no finality. 96
The Supreme Court found finality," but disagreed concerning
what the TDRs meant and their actual significance in takings

landmarks to protect well-known sites from destruction or abuse. Id. at 10809. Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, noted that although designating
a landmark restricted the owner's control of the land, it also enhanced his
economic position. Id. at 113. Real property owners in New York City who
had not developed their parcel to the extent allowed by city zoning laws could
transfer development rights to consolidated parcels on the same block. Id. at
113-14 (emphasis added).
19 Id. at 124. "A 'taking' may more readily be found when the interference
with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by
government... than when interference arises from some public
program... to promote the common good." Id. (citation omitted).
90 Suitum, 117 S. Ct. at 1663 (citing TRPA Code §§ 20.3C, 34.0 to 34.3).
The Court notes that TDRs are granted to property owners of parcels "eligible
for construction." Id.
91Id.
9 Id.
93id.

94Id. at 1664.
' Id. See Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 80 F.3d 359, 364 (9th
Cir. 1996), vacated, 117 S. Ct. 1659 (1997).
96 Id.

971d. at 1670.
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jurisprudence. 98 There is an interesting disparity between the
majority opinion and Justice Scalia's concurrence. 99
Justice Souter, writing for the majority, stated that there was
finality because there was no dispute - Suitum was entitled to the
TDRs.'" This case, like any other takings case, should be
tried. 10 ' At the trial, through the testimony of experts, the court
would decide what the TDRs were worth, and then decide
whether there has been a taking. 02 In other words, let the trial
court decide whether there has been a confiscation.'03
Justice Scalia, in his concurrence joined by Justices O'Connor
He declared that if
and Thomas, disagreed rather vigorously.'

you regulate a piece of property, and declare to the owner that it
cannot be developed, there has been a confiscation. "5

The

TDR's are just a gimmick by the government to have some thirdparty pay for the compensation. 6 Therefore, there is nothing to

91Id.
at

1672-73 (Scalia, J., concurring).
I Id. at 1670-73 (Scalia, J., concurring).
1 Id. at 1667.
o
10I Id. at 1662 (stating "[tihe sole question here is whether the claim is ripe
We hold that it is.").
for adjudication ...
12 Id. at 1668-69 (noting land values in a takings claim may be shown by
opinion evidence). In Suitum, the Court noted that Mrs. Suitum's "only
challenge to the TDRs raise[d] a question [concerning] their value not about
the lawfulness of issuing them." Id. at 1670.
103Id. ("we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.").
'4Id. at 1670-73 (Scalia, J., concurring).
103Id. at 1671 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia argues that while the
right to confer on another the right to use and develop one's land is valuable,
"it is a new right conferred on the landowner in exchange for the taking, rather
than a reduction of the taking." Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). He argued, by
analogy, that a government cash payment would not be determinative of
whether there was a taking, but whether the payment constituted adequate
compensation for that taking. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). Likewise, the TDR
relates to compensation, not to taking, and has nothing to do with any "final
decision" concerning the land. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). With regard to
takings, Justice Scalia argued that there is no "dispute over whether [it] has
occurred." Id. at 1672-73 (Scalia, J., concurring).
1oId. at 1672 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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argue about here -- there should only be a compensation trial.'
Justice Scalia's opinion is in line with what the Court has done
for the last ten years in restricting land regulation and protecting

property rights.'
How does that fit into the pine barrens situation? The attorney
for the plaintiff in the pine barrens litigation told me a couple of
days ago that both he and the Pine Barrens Commission lawyers
are arguing that Suitum helps them in some fashion.
In his concurrence, Justice Scalia referred to the famous Penn
Central case'09 of the late '70's, sort of the apogee of regulatory
power and support in the Supreme Court.
Penn Central Railroad wanted to put a fifty- five story building
on top of a building they owned, which had been designated a
landmark11 ° The Railroad was not permitted to do so,"' so it
brought a confiscation action. 12 The Supreme Court, in a famous

107

Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).

Justice Scalia notes that if the funds the

landowners get are considered in the taking question instead of compensation,
"the government can get away with paying much less. That is all that is going
on here." Id. at 1671-72 (Scalia, J., concurring). He argued that the plan
causes third parties, rather than the government, to furnish the payment, and
the government reimburses them by varying from "otherwise applicable landuse restrictions." Id. at 1672 (Scalia, J., concurring).
'0'
Id. at 1666. See Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton
Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
"oPenn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
"0 Id. at 115-16.
..Id. at 117.
12 Id. at 119. Penn Central had entered into a lease with the U.S. subsidiary
of a British corporation, Union General Properties, Ltd. [hereinafter UGP] Id.
at 116. UGP was to build a multistory office building above Grand Central
Terminal under the lease, and both parties applied to the city Landmarks
Preservations Commission for permission to build it. Id. The Commission
had designated Grand Central Terminal as an historic landmark, according to a
city law that protected certain pieces of real estate for historical significance.
Id. at 115. This "landmark law" noted that the city's standing as a worldwide
center of business and culture would be threatened if some of these historic
landmarks were not protected and that the law was enacted to "safeguard
desirable pieces of the existing urban fabric." Id. at 109. Because the plans
included stripping off some of the Terminal's outer features, the Commission
denied them a certificate. Id. at 117. The Commission stated that, "'To
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decision written by Justice Brennan, upheld the restriction,
finding no confiscation"

Penn Central still had both the railroad

and the station and was still in business.1 4 The fact that they
could not put a fifty-five story tower on top of the station did not
amount to a confiscation." 5
Justice Brennan noted, towards the end of the opinion, that Penn
Central had been given some TDRs to sell or transfer for their air
rights. 16 How does Justice Scalia deal with this? He says
perhaps there are other reasons for upholding Penn Central's
taking, but if those other reasons are not good enough, Penn
Central'sprecedential effect is largely gone."
Today's last case returns us to tort law. Saratoga Fishing
Company v. Martinac"' is a design defect case in which a

protect a Landmark, one does not tear it down. To perpetuate its architectural
features, one does not strip them off.'" Id.
113 Id. at 138. The Court held that even though the Landmarks Law has a
harsher impact on some owners of real estate than on others, it is not a taking.
Id.1 1
4 Id.

at 136.

Id. The Court explained "[a] taking is more easily found when the
element of "interference with property" is a "physical invasion by
government," rather than a public program that benefits economic life. Id. at
124. The argument, that Penn Central now could not exploit a property
interest that they had previously believed was available, was not accepted as
constituting a "taking." Id. at 130. The Court held that the law did not
interfere with Penn Central's uses of their Terminal, and that in fact the
designation of the station as a landmark would allow Penn to continue using
the property as a railroad station the same way that they always had. Id. at
136. Therefore, the law was held not to interfere with Penn Central's primary
purpose for using and exploiting the property. Id.
16 Id. at 137. Justice Brennan stated that Penn Central had not been denied
all of their air rights, they had only been made transferable to any of the other
parcels in the vicinity, which had also been designated as landmarks under the
city law. Id. These TDR's were held to "mitigate whatever financial burdens
the law has imposed on" Penn Central, and would be factored into the impact
the law had on Penn. Id.
Justice Scalia distinguished Penn
117 Id. at 1672 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Central from Suitum in that the regulation was applied to owners of eight
adjacent parcels near the Terminal, and the aggregation of that land coupled
with that use, had not been diminished. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
11

118 117 S. Ct. 1783 (1997).
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company (Martinac) built a fishing ship and sold it to a person by
the name of Madruga. 1 9 Madruga added a net, a skiff, and some
electronic equipment to the ship, and then sold it to Saratoga
Fishing. 120 Twelve years later, the ship went down because the
hydraulic system failed - there was a total loss. 12' The action was
brought by Saratoga Fishing against the original ship builder for
product liability, claiming that there was a design defect in the
ship.12
It is a basic concept of product liability law, and perhaps
negligence law as well, that there can be no recovery for pure
economic loss.' 23 If you are injured and you cannot work or
operate your business or profession anymore, that is not

considered pure economic loss. It is economic loss that results
from personal injury. Economic loss not accompanied by
property damage or personal injury is not recoverable. 4
Under tort product liability law, the concept is: if the product
malfunctions due to a design or manufacturing defect in the
product that destroys the product itself and there is economic
loss, the product owner cannot recover either for the loss of the
product or economic loss. However, if the product malfunctions
and destroys some other property, the owner can recover in tort.
Cayuga Harvester, Inc. v Allis-Chalmers Corp.'25 isa good
analogue. Cayuga Harvester is a products liability case brought
because the harvesters did not work and the plaintiff lost the
crop. 126 The Court considered that as pure economic loss. 127 If
119

Id. at 1785.

120
Id.
121

Id.

12id.

" "[Tort law.., does not permit recovery for purely economic losses
(such as) lost profits." Id. at 1786 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTs:
PRODUCTS LIABiLrrY § 6, Comment d (Proposed Final Draft, Preliminary
Version, 1996)).
124 Saratoga, 117 S. Ct. at 1786. "Given the availability of warranties, the
courts should not ask tort law to perform a job that contract law might perform
better." Id. A product that destroys itself is very similar to a product that
does not work, or works improperly. Id.
' 95 A.D.2d 5, 465 N.Y.S.2d 606 (4th Dep't 1983).
126
Id.at 7, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 609.
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there is to be any recovery for the product itself, it has to be
brought under contract law or warranty, not under tort law.'8
Let me add one further aspect to this analogue. If the harvester
in Cayuga Harvester had exploded, the owner would be able to
recover if the explosion resulted in a fire that destroyed the crop.
That would be destruction of other property. The key word is
other property. So if the product malfunctions in some way, and
you can not resort to warranty law, you can resort to contract
law. You cannot recover for the economic loss of the product in
tort. You can only recover in tort if the malfunction damages
some of your other products.
How does this relate to Saratoga Fishing, in which the ship
builder was sued many years later? After the defendant in
Saratoga sold the fishing vessel to Madruga, Madruga added
other property to it: a net, electronic equipment and a skiff, and
sold it to Saratoga Fishing." 9 Saratoga Fishing knew it could not
recover for the ship itself, but believed it was entitled to
recover for the other property that was on the ship when Saratoga
Fishing bought it from Madruga. T'
Justice Breyer, writing a seven to two decision, concluded that
the net, the electronic equipment, and the skiff was "other
property." 31 2 Since one of the rationales for product liability is to
make manufacturers conscious of their liability, holding the
manufacturer in this case would help to accomplish that goal. 1
127 d. at 27, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 621.
2

Id.

Saratoga, 117 S. Ct. at 1789. The Court held that equipment added after
sale of a product by a manufacturer to an initial user is "not part of the product
that itself caused physical harm," but "other property." Id.
129

130 Id.
131
32

1

33

1

Id.

Id. at 1787.
Id. The Court stated:
One important purpose of defective product tort law is to
encourage the manufacture of safer products. The various
tort rules that determine which foreseeable losses are
recoverable aim ...

to provide appropriate safe-product

incentives. [A] liability rule that diminishes liability simply
because of resale ...

diminishes the basis incentive.
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The manufacturer should not be in a situation where it is free
from responsibility for a manufacturing or design defect.' 34
Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion135 makes an interesting
confession. He says that the Court is not the proper place to
decide the instant issue; the state court is much better suited for
the job.' 36 He notes that the Court is treading in waters where it
does not belong and disagrees with what the majority has done.'37
What can we learn from this? Saratoga should be considered by
state courts when they consider what is "other property" and
what the manufacturer's liability should be for a design defect
when additions have been made to the product years after the
original sale.
There are two other cases that I would like to discuss briefly,
Adams v. Robertson3 and Amchem Products v. Windsor, 139 both
of which are class action cases.
In Adams, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and then
dismissed the case. 4° The issue in Adams was whether the
Alabama Supreme Court's approval of a class action settlement,
where the class members were not given the right to opt out of
the class, violated due process. 4 ' The Court noted that this issue
was not properly raised in the state court. 42 When the case came
circumstance requires a justification. [W]hy should a series
of resales, after replacement and additions of ... physical
items, progressively immunize a manufacturer to an ever
greater extent from the liability for foreseeable physical
damage that would otherwise fall upon it?

Id.
134

Id.

Id. at 1789-92 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
131 Id. at 1789 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
135

137 Id. at 1789 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia states that "[w]ith this
disclaimer, and with the admission that I am only modestly more confident of
my resolution of this case than I am of the Court's, I proceed (reluctantly) to
discussion of the merits." Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
...
Adams v. Robertson, 117 S. Ct. 1028 (1997).
139 Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997).
'40 Adams, 117 S. Ct. at 1032.

141

Id. at 1030.

142id.
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before the Alabama Supreme Court, the issue was noted in a
point heading of the appellant's brief, but never actually
discussed. 43
Amchem Products v. Windsor'" is a case concerning a global
asbestos settlement, where representatives of the plaintiff class
got together with the manufacturers and said-let's agree. 4 s The

Supreme Court rejected the settlement. 146

Justice Ginsburg,

writing for the Court, stated that there was such an enormous
disparity between people who are making asbestos related claims
that the class representatives were not representative enough and
4 7
thus it could not be said that common questions predominated.
Id. Petitioners argued that they raised the federal claim in their brief
when arguing in the Alabama Supreme Court. Id. The brief contains
discussion of a related case, Brown v. Ticor, 982 F.2d 386 (9th Cir. 1992),
cert. dismissed, 511 U.S. 117 (1994), but the case was mentioned in an
argument relating to the state constitution, rather than federal due process. Id.
The Court held that discussing a federal case in "an unrelated argument"
cannot put the state court on notice that it is presented with a federal claim.
Id.
144 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997).
145 Id. at 2239-41.
"Untold numbers of individuals may fall within this
description." Id. at 2239-40. A complaint and settlement stipulation filed in
the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania described the class
as:
[A]II persons who had not filed an asbestos-related lawsuit
against a CCR [Center for Claims Resolution], defendant
[Amchem] as of the date the class action commenced, but
143

who (1) had been exposed ...to asbestos or products

containing asbestos attributable to a CCR defendant, or (2)
whose spouse or family member had been so exposed.
Id.46at 2239.
1 Id.at 2246.
147 Id. at 2250 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (b) (3)). The Court explains that
Rule 23 (b) (3) requires that common questions must predominate over any
claim "affecting only individual members," and class resolution must be
"superior to other available methods of... adjudication .... " Id. at 2246.
The commonality requirement was not met. Id. at 2249. Even though Rule
23(a)'s commonality requirement may be met by the fact that all class
members were exposed to asbestos, the predominance requirement has a
higher threshold. Id. at 2250. Since there were more questions concerning
the different categories of these class members, which may be uncommon,
"any overarching dispute about the health consequences of asbestos exposure
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Justice Breyer concurred,
have decided the

case.149

48
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writing that the majority should not

It should have been sent back to the

district court. 50
The last case I will mention this afternoon is Bennett v. Spear.'5
In Bennett, a couple of water districts and ranchers attacked a
holding of the Fish and Wildlife Agency which provided that
certain lakes' levels needed to be reduced in order to save certain
fish which had been designated as endangered species."S2
The plaintiffs brought an action attacking the ruling of the Fish
and Wildlife Agency and the Secretary of the Interior.'53 The
question presented was whether they had the standing to bring the
lawsuit. 54 The Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion, held that

cannot satisfy the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance standard." Id. at 2250. As the
Third Circuit held, the class members were exposed to different products
containing asbestos, "for different amounts of time, in different ways, and
over different periods." Id. (quoting Georgine v. Amchem Prods., 83 F.3d
610, 626 (3d Cir. 1996). The Court notes that "[n]o settlement class called to
our attention is as sprawling as this one." Amchem, 117 S. Ct. at 2250.
Id. at 2253 (Breyer, J., concurring).
1'9 Id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
148

150

Id. (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Breyer stated:
I do not believe that we should.., set aside the findings of
the District Court. That court is far more familiar with the
issues and litigants than is a court of appeals or are we, and
therefore has broad discretion.

. .

with respect to matters

involving the certification.
Id. (citations omitted).
151117

S. Ct. 1154 (1997).

'12 Id. at 1159. A federal reclamation plan known as the Klamath Project, is
a series of rivers, lakes, and dams in California and Oregon, administered by
the Secretary of the Interior, pursuant to his authority under the Endangered
Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq. In 1992, the Bureau of
Reclamation notified the Fish & Wildlife Service that the project might affect
the survival of the Lost River Sucker and Shortnose Sucker. Id. The service
issued an opinion holding that the project could endanger those fish, and
offered alternatives, which the Bureau elected to follow. Id.
"I Id. Two Oregon water districts and two ranch operators that receive
Klamath Project water then sued the Service director and the Secretary of the
Interior. Id.
154Id.
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they did because the statute itself says that any citizen may sue.'
The case is somewhat more complex but, since it is late, we need
to conclude.
I would like to thank everyone for their attendance. I would
also like to thank all the program participants for making this a
stimulating and thought-provoking symposium.

Id. at 1665. The statute provides that any individual may sue the
Secretary of the Interior "where there is alleged a failure of the Secretary to
perform any act or duty under Section 1553 of this title which is not
discretionary...." 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1). Id. The petitioners claimed
that the Service's Biological opinion did not comply with the statutory mandate
that the Secretary of the Interior take economic impact into consideration when
singling out any area as critical habitat. Id. The Court held this claim came
within the citizen-suit provision. Id.
155
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